PREFACE: The deception of the Government does not minimize the sacrifice of those Vietnam Veterans who sacrificed and served honorably.
Gulf of Tonkin incident, complex naval event in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the coast of Vietnam, that occurred from August 2 to August 4, 1964, during the Vietnam War. It was described to the U.S. Congress on August 5, 1964, as two unprovoked attacks by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on the U.S. destroyers Maddox and Turner Joy. The Gulf of Tonkin incident led to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which allowed President Lyndon B. Johnson to greatly escalate U.S. military involvement in the war.
By the night of August 4, the U.S. military had intercepted North Vietnamese communications that led officials to believe that a North Vietnamese attack on its destroyers was being planned. Those communications most likely referred to operations to salvage the torpedo boat that had been damaged in the earlier firefight. That night proved to be a stormy one. The Maddox and Turner Joy moved out to sea, but both reported that they were tracking multiple unidentified vessels approaching their positions. The vessels appeared to be coming from several different directions, and they were impossible to lock onto.
Both ships began firing at what they thought were torpedo boats, and again they sought air support. A plane piloted by Commander James Stockdale joined the action, flying at low altitude to see the enemy ships. Stockdale reported seeing no torpedo boats. Several hours later, Captain John Herrick of the Maddox, after reviewing the events, sent the message, “Review of action makes many reported contacts and torpedoes fired appear doubtful. Freak weather effects on radar and overeager sonarmen may have accounted for many reports. …Suggest complete evaluation before any further action taken.”
Johnson and his advisers had approved retaliatory strikes on North Vietnamese naval bases as soon as the reports of the apparent attack of August 4 came in. Intelligence officials realized the obvious. When President Johnson asked during a 4 August meeting of the National Security Council, “Do they want a war by attacking our ships in the middle of the Gulf of Tonkin?” CIA Director John McCone answered matter-of-factly, “No, the North Vietnamese are reacting defensively to our attacks on their offshore islands . . . the attack is a signal to us that the North Vietnamese have the will and determination to continue the war.”28
Johnson himself apparently had his own doubts about what happened in the Gulf on 4 August. A few days after the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was passed, he commented, “Hell, those damn, stupid sailors were just shooting at flying fish.” President Johnson, McNamara, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk were all trying to convince Congress and the American public that the North Vietnamese attacks were unprovoked, but Hubert Humphrey, Johnson’s presumed running mate in the upcoming election, broke with the administration line.
We may never know the whole truth behind the Tonkin events and the motivations of those involved. However, it is important to put what we do know into context. The administration’s zeal for aggressive action, motivated by President Johnson’s election worries, created an atmosphere of recklessness and overenthusiasm in which it became easy to draw conclusions based on scanty evidence and to overlook normally prudent precautionary measures. Without the full picture, Congress could not offer the checks and balances it was designed to provide. Subsequently, the White House carried the nation into the longest and one of the most costly conflicts in our nation’s history.
SOURCES: Brittanica Enc., Miller Center, Naval Inst.
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